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Abstract   An experimental fishing vessel buyout program was initiated in 1995
to remove vessels from the Northeast United States groundfish fishery. Informa-
tion provided by the applicants to this program was used to evaluate the likely
participation and potential cost of an expanded buyout initiative. This paper de-
scribes the pilot buyout program and the econometric procedures used to
forecast participation and bids at various levels of program spending. Program
participation and bid levels were modeled in two stages using participation and
bid functions. The expanded buyout program, completed in April 1998, provided
a unique opportunity to evaluate initial participation and cost forecasts. Meth-
ods used in this study are also applicable to modeling other fishery related
economic decisions, such as the trading of individual transferable quota shares.
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Introduction
Accumulated growth in U.S. domestic and international fishing capacity has re-
ceived increasing attention over the past several years. At an international level,
these concerns have been codified in the General Principles of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct and addressed within the FAO Interna-
tional Plan of Action for Managing Fishing Capacity (FAO 1995; 1999). The U.S. is
a signatory to these agreements and has identified excess capacity as an impediment
to sustainable fisheries (NOAA 1997). While these agreements and statements of
policy provide a formal statement of the problem and need for capacity reduction,
they do not endorse any particular reduction mechanism.
Andrew Kitts and Eric Thunberg are economists, both are in the Social Sciences Branch at the U.S. Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service, Northeast Fisheries Science Center, 166 Water St., Woods Hole, MA
USA 02543, email: andrew.kitts@noaa.gov and eric.thunberg@noaa.gov, respectively. John Robertson is
a research officer in the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta USA, 104 Marietta St.,
NW, Atlanta, GA 30303-2713, email: John.C.Robertson@atl.frb.org.
The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System, nor do they necessarily reflect the policy of the National Marine
Fisheries Service.Kitts, Thunberg, and Robertson 222
Mechanisms for capacity reduction have been characterized as being incentive
blocking or incentive-adjusting methods (FAO 1998). Incentive-blocking methods
include license limitation, vessel catch limits, and buyout; while incentive-adjusting
methods could include taxes or various forms of rights-based management.1 A clear
preference has emerged among economists for the latter (FAO 1998; Gates, Holland,
and Gudmundsson 1996), while fishery management governing bodies have tended
to opt for the former. Among the incentive blocking methods, vessel buybacks have
been implemented in a variety of fisheries (Read and Buck 1997; Gates, Holland,
and Gudmundsson 1996), but usually not until overfishing has resulted in a resource
crisis. In the Northeast groundfish fishery, a crisis point was reached in 1995 when
several key groundfish stocks had either collapsed or were on the verge of collapse
(Wang and Rosenberg 1997). In anticipation of the stringent management measures
that would be required to rebuild these stocks and their accompanying economic ef-
fects, a suite of financial assistance programs were developed by Congressional
mandate, among which was a vessel buyout.
As noted previously, the efficacy of buyouts to achieve either conservation or
financial assistance objectives has been questioned. These issues were raised at the
time of the New England buyout by the Department of Commerce’s Inspector Gen-
eral (1997). Subsequent assessments of the effectiveness of the buyout have focused
on its potential short- and long-term effects (NMFS 2000) and the level of capacity
that remained in the groundfish fishery even after the buyout had been completed
(United States General Accounting Office 2000). While these studies, and others
like them, have important implications for buyout program design, we focus on a set
of methods that were used, and may be used by others, to forecast willingness to
participate and costs, given that a policy decision has been made to implement a
buyout.
The vessel buyout program in the Northeast groundfish fishery was imple-
mented in two stages, beginning with a $2 million pilot buyout followed by a larger
$23 million buyout. The pilot was implemented to test various qualification and ad-
ministrative aspects of a buyout and to reveal industry interest. The pilot program
provided an opportunity: (a) to develop predictive models of willingness to partici-
pate and reservation prices for a full-scale buyout, and (b) to compare model predic-
tions to actual performance in the expanded buyout. This paper provides a descrip-
tion of the pilot and expanded buyout programs, and the statistical models devel-
oped to predict participation and costs for the expanded program. The paper is orga-
nized as a chronology beginning with a brief overview of groundfish management
and the buildup of the Northeast groundfish fleet. This overview is followed by a
description of the pilot buyout program and a description of the statistical models.
The last section provides a description of the expanded buyout program and com-
pares predicted with actual participation and program costs.
Northeast Groundfish Management and Buildup of the Fleet
Since the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1977, the groundfish fishery in the north-
eastern U.S. has been managed under three fishery management plans (FMPs) devel-
oped by the New England Fishery Management Council (Council) and NOAA’s Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Between 1977 and 1982, the fishery was
managed primarily by quotas for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder. During this
1 A case could be made for classifying a buyout as an incentive adjusting method because it provides an
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period, stocks began rebuilding following overfishing by foreign fleets. Even as the
foreign fishery was being eliminated, the U.S. domestic fleet was experiencing a
marked increase in new vessel construction stimulated by the economic opportunity
created by the displacement of the foreign fleets, increased stock abundance, and
rising consumer demand for seafood. The expansion of the domestic fleet was also
influenced, to a lesser extent, by a suite of direct assistance and tax incentive pro-
grams promoting the replacement and new construction of fishing vessels (Federal
Fisheries Investment Task Force 1999).
Due to database changes, a consistent time series illustrating the pattern of ves-
sel entry into the Northeast groundfish fishery can only be constructed using data
from three New England states (Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island). These
states account for the majority of vessels and landings of groundfish in the Northeast
and are likely to be representative of the Northeast region as a whole. From 1965 until
1973, an average of 581 vessels per year participated in the New England groundfish
fishery (figure 1). Approximately 50 vessels that had not previously been identified in
any prior year were added annually to the fleet. However, as new vessels were being
added, other vessels were leaving the fishery, so the net average increase in the
groundfish fleet was only nine vessels per year. There was an average of 38 newly
constructed or documented New England vessels per year from 1965 to 1973.2
2 Reported data from Fisheries of the United States (FUS) (issued annually; covering 1964–82). Issues
prior to 1970 were prepared by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and are available via interlibrary loan.
Issues since 1970 are available from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington D.C.
Figure 1.  Additions to the New England Fishing Fleet (1965 to 1980) and
Number of Vessels Landing Groundfish in Maine,
Massachusetts, or Rhode Island (1965 to 1997)Kitts, Thunberg, and Robertson 224
Between 1974 and 1980, an unprecedented increase in fleet size occurred. In
1979 alone, 176 vessels were added to the groundfish fishery, and in 1980, 1,185
vessels landed groundfish in New England. Since 1980, the New England ground-
fish fleet has gradually declined, but presently is nearly 60% larger than during the
pre-Magnuson Act period.
The buildup in the fishing capacity during the late 1970s resulted in an increas-
ing number of vessels fishing on annual quotas (TACs). Lacking a basis for control-
ling the number of participants (for example, limited entry or property rights), the
groundfish quotas were rapidly attained, leading to volatile market conditions and a
number of management and enforcement problems. At the same time, resource im-
pacts were becoming evident. Dissatisfaction with TACs led to their replacement in
1982 with indirect controls on fishing effort. These indirect controls (gear restric-
tions and minimum fish sizes) were implemented under the Interim Plan. This plan
was designed to provide resource protection, while a more comprehensive and effec-
tive approach could be developed. However, such technical measures were not suffi-
cient, and groundfish stocks continued to decline.
The current Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (Multispecies
Plan) was implemented in 1986. The Plan added seven more species to the manage-
ment unit (three more species were added through the amendment process in 1991)
and instituted a number of regulatory changes. However, the basic framework of in-
direct effort control was retained. Presently, 11 of the species managed under the
plan are defined as regulated or “large-mesh” species: cod, haddock, pollock, yel-
lowtail flounder, winter or blackback flounder, witch flounder, American plaice, red-
fish, white hake, Atlantic halibut, and windowpane flounder. The three remaining
“small-mesh”species are red hake, silver hake, and ocean pout.
Without direct controls on fishing mortality, groundfish stocks declined to
record low levels. In May 1994, Amendment 5 to the plan was enacted which
capped the number of vessels in the fishery through a limited-access program and
controlled the amount of time vessels could spend at sea. A Secretarial action in
1994 also resulted in large-scale area closures. Subsequently, the Council developed
further modifications to the Multispecies Plan to rebuild the groundfish stocks.
Amendment 7 was implemented July 1996 and included a more rigorous days-at-sea
(DAS) reduction schedule, removal of most exemptions from DAS controls, and a
more flexible adjustment process to respond to specific resource conditions.
To mitigate the economic impacts of Amendment 7 management measures on
fishing industries and marine-dependent communities, several financial assistance
programs were implemented by Congressional action. One of these was the Fishing
Capacity Reduction Demonstration Program ($2 million), hereafter referred to as the
pilot buyout program, enacted in June, 1995. Subsequently, $23 million was made
available for the Fishing Capacity Reduction Initiative, hereafter referred to as the
expanded buyout program. Although the primary objective of these programs was to
provide financial assistance, the buyouts were also designed to provide conservation
benefits for the groundfish fishery.
The pilot buyout program was designed to evaluate the level of interest in a ves-
sel buyout program and to test a variety of implementation protocols (such as bid-
ding procedures, scrapping provisions, and eligibility/selection criteria). The pilot
buyout program was concluded in February, 1996, with the selection of 11 vessels
from a pool of 114 applicants.
Prior to funds being appropriated for the expanded buyout program, analyses
were conducted to estimate how many and what kind of vessels could be removed in
a full-scale buyout initiative. In the pilot buyout program, the bids submitted by the
114 applicants totaled nearly $52 million.
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scale buyout, data from the pilot buyout were used to model participation and bid
prices. The expanded buyout program was implemented in September, 1996, and
concluded in April, 1998. In this paper, we describe the methods used to develop
forecasts for the expanded buyout. We also compare our forecasts of participation
and program costs to actual program performance.
Description of the Pilot Buyout Program
Eligibility for the pilot buyout program was limited in the following ways: (i) par-
ticipation was limited to two of the six different multispecies limited-access permit
categories; (ii) vessel owners were required to demonstrate that at least 65% of their
fishing revenue was derived from combined landings of the ten regulated large-mesh
groundfish in three of four years from 1991 to 1994; and (iii) vessel owners were
required to demonstrate that their vessel was capable of fishing under its own power
in federal waters.
Participation in the buyout was voluntary and bids were solicited through a re-
verse auction, whereby each vessel owner prepared a bid or price at which he/she
would be willing to render the vessel in an unfishable condition and surrender all
federal fishing permits. Vessel selection was based on the ratio of the bid to the
vessel’s groundfish revenue, where vessels with low ratios placed higher in the
rankings. Bids were not subject to negotiation upon acceptance by the government.
However, owners of the selected vessels were given an opportunity to reconsider
their decision to participate in the buyout. Successful bidders that then decided not
to participate were removed from further consideration and the next highest ranked
vessel was selected. Vessel owners were not required to surrender their right to reen-
ter the multispecies fishery or enter any other fishery provided they could purchase
a vessel with the appropriate permits.
Decision Modeling
Presented with a buyout opportunity, a vessel owner faces two sequential (and possi-
bly interrelated) decisions: (i) whether or not to apply for the buyout; and (ii) what
dollar amount to declare as a bid. The first stage is a discrete choice to submit an
application or not. In the second stage, the owner must choose a bid that is worth-
while and competitive. Although bids were observed only from those that chose to
participate, landings, vessel characteristics, and permit data were available for the
pool of vessels that met the eligibility criteria. These data formed the basis for mod-
eling of buyout program participation and bidding.
Several alternative statistical methods were available for modeling the bidding
process. The participation stage could easily be modeled using standard Logit or
Probit regression techniques. These give the likelihood that an individual with a cer-
tain set of characteristics will participate in the buyout program. However, predict-
ing the likely size of the bid in the population is not as straightforward. Bids from
individuals who did not participate were not observed, and the qualification criteria
restricted access to the buyout program to a subset of limited-access permit holders.
A simple, linear regression approach could, therefore, not be used due to the correla-
tion between regression errors and the explanatory variables (Maddala 1983). To
overcome this problem, three alternative statistical models were considered: the
Tobit model (Tobin 1958), Cragg’s double-hurdle model (Cragg 1971), and
Heckman’s sample selection model (Heckman 1976). Due to space considerations,
we discuss these models only in very general terms.Kitts, Thunberg, and Robertson 226
In the Tobit model, the predicted bid is given by the expected bid conditional on
a positive bid being observed, times the probability that a positive bid will be ob-
served. A Tobit model can be estimated by including in the bid regression the in-
verse Mills ratio (IMR) obtained from a first-stage Probit that uses the same regres-
sors as the bid function (with standard errors appropriately adjusted for the presence
of a fitted value as a regressor). The inclusion of the IMR effectively accounts for
the correlation between the errors and regressors. Although the Tobit model is exten-
sively used in demand analysis, it was rejected for our purposes because the same
factors are assumed to affect the probability of bidding and the expected magnitude
of the bid, given that a bid is made. For example, an owner with an older vessel
might be more likely to submit a bid than someone with a newer vessel with a
longer expected useful life. Asset theory suggests that the value (hence the reserva-
tion price) of the older vessel should be lower than the newer vessel. However, the
Tobit model does not accommodate these opposite effects among the explanatory
variables. To address this, we first considered the double hurdle model suggested by
Cragg (1971). In this model, the variables affecting the probability of a positive bid
are allowed to differ from those affecting the expected bid.
In the usual formulation of the Cragg model, the probability and bid regressions
are assumed to be independent. This somewhat unrealistic assumption permits esti-
mation to proceed in two steps, whereby the probability of a positive bid is esti-
mated using a Probit or Logit regression, and the coefficients of the bid function are
estimated by a truncated regression of the positive bids. In cases where the variables
in each regression are identical, Cragg’s model collapses to a Tobit. The Cragg
model may be appropriate in instances where truncated values are observed. For ex-
ample, in contingent valuation studies, zero bids may be observed when a respon-
dent indicates a zero willingness to pay.
In the pilot buyout, bids were only observed for owners with eligible vessels
that chose to submit a bid in the reverse auction. In this instance, bids by owners
with eligible vessels that did not participate were unobserved. Under these circum-
stances Heckman’s two-stage model best approximates the decision process for the
vessel buyout. Heckman’s model also allows the variables influencing each decision
to differ, but does not require that the two equations be independent. As with a Tobit
model, the Heckman model can be estimated by including in the bid regression the
IMR obtained from a first-stage Probit model. However, in the Heckman model, the
bid function need not contain the same regressors as the probability model.
Participation Model
Participation in the buyout may be assumed to be influenced by a vessel owner’s
past and expected future earnings from his/her vessel, vessel condition, the owner’s
financial status, alternative occupations, age, and other socioeconomic factors. Of
these factors, data on vessel owner’s financial status, demographic characteristics,
or vessel condition are not routinely collected and were not collected as part of the
pilot buyout application. Gross revenue data provided by the bid applicants were
supplemented with landings and permit information (from NMFS databases) to de-
velop the following first-stage decision model:
PART =  f(RATIO, DAS, AGE, GILLNET)
Where PART =  1 if a bid was submitted; 0 otherwise
RATIO =  total groundfish earnings divided by total earnings
DAS =  allocated Amendment 7 fishing days
AGE =  vessel age in years
GILLNET =  1 if gillnet gear; 0 otherwiseModeling Participation and Bids for Vessel Buyouts 227
Since Amendment 7 management measures would have the greatest impact on
vessels most dependent on groundfish, the ratio of groundfish revenue to gross rev-
enues (RATIO) was used as an indicator of relative reliance on the groundfish fish-
ery. It is expected that vessels with a higher ratio are more likely to participate in
the pilot buyout. Further, since the selection criteria favored vessels with a high de-
pendence on groundfish, RATIO also represented the expectation of being selected
for buyout. The ratio variable was also used in examining alternative eligibility cri-
teria based on relative groundfish dependence. Future earning potential from the
groundfish fishery would be constrained by the vessel owner’s allocated fishing ef-
fort. At the time of the pilot buyout, the timing of the effort reduction schedule was
still under discussion, but the total effort reduction was known. Therefore, each
vessel’s fishing effort constraint was captured by its DAS allocation at the end of
the Amendment 7 reduction schedule. Vessel age (AGE) was used as a proxy for a
vessel’s operating condition. Since fishing time was counted differently for gillnet
vessels as compared to mobile gear, a dummy variable (GILLNET) was created to
differentiate gillnet vessels from all other vessels. As suggested by an anonymous
reviewer, this difference in accounting for fishing time may have affected the mar-
ginal participation probabilities, so the gillnet dummy variable was multiplied by
each of the independent variables to create three interaction terms.
The participation data included all vessels for which a bid had been submitted to
the pilot program (participants), as well as all vessels identified in the NMFS land-
ings database as meeting the eligibility requirements (i.e., 65% dependence on
groundfish and the appropriate limited-access permit types). Of the 114 participants,
16 were not included in the analysis due to missing observations for one or more of
the independent variables. The total number of eligible non-participants was 153
vessel owners.
Willingness to participate in the pilot buyout was positively related to vessel
age (AGE) and dependence on groundfish (RATIO), and the coefficients for these
two variables were statistically significant (table 1). The coefficient for allocated DAS
was not statistically significant, but it was positively related to participation. The ratio
interaction term (GILLNET*RATIO), and the age interaction term (GILLNET*AGE)
were positively related to participation. Willingness to participate in the pilot buyout
was negatively related to the days-at-sea interaction term (GILLNET*DAS). Al-
though none of these interaction terms was statistically significant, their inclusion
made a small improvement in the model’s ability to predict participation.
Using the parameter estimates from the participation model, 187 of the 251 ves-
sel owners (75%) were correctly classified as a buyout participant or nonparticipant
Table 1
Participation Model Results
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio
Constant –5.13 1.06 –4.84
RATIO a 4.91 1.12 4.37
DAS 0.79E–3 0.46E–2 0.17
AGE a 0.03 0.01 2.50
GILLNET*RATIO 8.94 6.22 1.44
GILLNET*DAS –0.11 0.07 –1.67
GILLNET*AGE 0.04 0.05 0.80
a Significant at the 5% level.
Chi-Squared = 63.93.
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(table 2). Of the 153 nonparticipants, the model correctly predicted 125 as nonpar-
ticipants (82%). Of the 98 participants, the model correctly predicted 62 as partici-
pants (63%).
The participation model was better able to predict participation by gillnet vessel
owners as opposed to owners of vessels with other gear types. Of the 73 gillnet ves-
sel owners, participation classification was correct for 68 owners (93%). Of the 287
owners of vessels with other gear types, participation classification was correct for
202 owners (70%).
Bid Model
A vessel owner’s bid was assumed to be equal to the present value of expected fu-
ture net earnings plus the difference between the cost of scrapping the vessel and its
salvage value:3








Thus, an owner’s asking price is expected to be influenced primarily by factors that
affect the future net earning potential of his/her vessel. These factors include the re-
maining years of serviceable life of the fishing vessel, the earning potential of the
vessel, and vessel operating costs. Vessel level data for all of these factors (particu-
larly operating costs) are not routinely collected, so the following proxies were used
in the second-stage bid model:
BID =  f(TOTREV, AGE, HP, GILLNET, DAS, IMR)
Where BID =  the vessel owner’s submitted bid
TOTREV =  total revenue from all fisheries
AGE =  vessel age
HP =  vessel main engine horsepower
GILLNET =  1 if gillnet gear; 0 otherwise
DAS =  Amendment 7 allocated fishing time
IMR =  Inverse Mill’s Ration from first-stage
3 Selected vessel owners were required to scrap their vessel but were permitted to sell engines, winches,
gear, electronics, and anything else that could be removed from the vessel prior to cutting up the hull.
Table 2
Within Sample Predictions of Participation Model
Model Predictions
Actual Non-participants Participants Total % Correct
Non-participant 125 28 153 (82%)
Participants 36 62 98 (63%)
Total 161 90 251Modeling Participation and Bids for Vessel Buyouts 229
Since recent past income levels provide some measure of future vessel performance,
average annual gross revenues (TOTREV) from 1991 to 1994 were used as a proxy
for expected future earnings. Vessel age (AGE) provides an indicator of the potential
remaining serviceable life of the vessel. The main engine horsepower (HP) of a ves-
sel was used as a proxy for vessel size. Larger vessels are more expensive to operate
but also have greater range and effective fishing power. Thus, horsepower is an indi-
cator of potential net income production in groundfish or alternative fisheries. A
vessel’s fishing effort allocation (DAS) was used to account for the vessel’s income
constraint with respect to groundfish. The dummy variable indicating gillnet gear
(GILLNET) accounted for differences in value based on gear type, and the IMR was
derived from the first-stage participation model.
The bid function was estimated using a double-log functional form, so the pa-
rameter estimates are interpreted as elasticities. For example, a 1% change in
TOTREV results in a 0.19% increase in the offer price (table 3). Similarly, the elas-
ticity of the marginal bid value of a day-at-sea, as measured by the DAS variable,
was positive and near unity, suggesting that bid values are proportional to DAS allo-
cations. The coefficient on HP is positive, which suggests that more powerful ves-
sels are valued more highly. The coefficient for GILLNET was not statistically sig-
nificant, but being positive suggests that gillnet vessels are valued more highly. The
coefficient for vessel age (AGE) was not statistically significant but negative, indi-
cating that older vessels are valued less than newer vessels.
Forecasts and Actual Participation in the Expanded Buyout Program
Based on the Pilot program results, several potential changes to the eligibility and
administrative features of the expanded buyout program were considered. These in-
cluded lowering the groundfish dependence requirement, expansion of the limited-ac-
cess permit categories, and providing non-fishing alternatives to scrapping the vessel. Of
these changes, the groundfish dependence criterion was maintained at 65%, but allow-
ance for participation by all limited-access permit categories and greater flexibility to
transfer vessels to non-fishing uses were adopted. In all other respects, the $23 million





Variable Coefficient Standard Error t–ratio
Constant a –2.73 1.64 –1.67
TOTREV a 0.19 0.78 2.41
AGE –0.21 0.12 –1.73
HP a 0.63 0.15 4.16
GILLNET 0.04 0.19 0.20
DAS a 0.90 0.29 3.09
IMR –0.12 0.15 –0.82
a Significant at the 5% level or greater.
n = 98Kitts, Thunberg, and Robertson 230
Given the above criteria, 360 vessel owners were identified through NMFS per-
mit and landings databases as being eligible to submit a bid in the expanded buyout
program. Of the eligible vessel owners, 120 were predicted to submit a bid, while
140 vessels submitted bids to the expanded buyout (table 4). If all vessels could be
removed, the projected program cost would have been $43.1 million for the 106 ves-
sels, as compared to $52.7 million if all 140 participating vessels had been removed.
The average expected bid was estimated to be $358 thousand compared to the
actual average bid of $376 thousand (table 4). Among forecasted buyout applicants,
average vessel length, horsepower, and tonnage were 66 feet, 502 hp, and 99 tons,
respectively. Average vessel size of actual buyout applicants was slightly larger at
67 feet, 535 hp, and 109 tons. The forecasted average ton days were 11.9 thousand,
while average ton days for actual participants were 13.2 thousand.
The selection criterion for the expanded buyout was the same as that in the Pi-
lot. Ordering vessels from lowest to highest bid to groundfish revenue ratio and
summing to the $23 million program budget yielded a predicted 51 vessels that
would be removed (table 5), at an average cost of $444 thousand. The actual number
of removed vessels was 68, at an average cost of $332 thousand. Fewer vessels were
forecasted to be removed under the $23 million budget constraint due to the ten-
dency to select for larger vessels. Predicted average horsepower, length, gross tons,
and allocated fishing time were all greater than actual removals.
Conclusions
The modeling procedures employed herein have some promise in evaluating and de-
veloping forecasts for vessel buyout program participation and expected costs. Simi-
lar modeling methods may be appropriate where surveys are used to ascertain inter-
est in a vessel buyout. In the case of the Northeast groundfish buyout, the Pilot pro-
gram participants were representative of the expanded population of vessel owners
allowing forecasts to be developed of total program costs and the number of vessels
that might be removed.
Table 4
Comparison of Predicted to Actual Expanded Buyout Program Applicants
Decision Model Actual Buyout
Forecast Applicants
Number of vessels 120 140
Total cost (millions) $43.1 $52.7
Average bid $358,759 $376,200
Average ratio of groundfish revenue to total revenue 0.95 0.87
Average annual total revenue $308,970 $391,100
Average annual groundfish revenue $282,717 $351,400
Average allocated days-at-sea 110 113
Average vessel age 22 18
Average horse power 502 535
Average vessel length (feet) 66 67
Average gross tons 99 109
Average ton days 11,891 13,176
Total ton days (millions) 1.40 1.84Modeling Participation and Bids for Vessel Buyouts 231
Differences in vessels predicted to participate in the expanded program, based
on information from the pilot project, and the actual expanded program participants
can partly be explained by the difference in expectations about the regulatory envi-
ronment prior to the pilot project and prior to the expanded program. During the pi-
lot project, major changes in fishing regulations (Amendment 7 to the Groundfish
FMP) were being formulated, and there was considerable uncertainty about the se-
verity of the restrictions. By the time the expanded program occurred, Amendment 7
was adopted and there was more certainty about the regulatory environment. This
change in expectations may have altered the decision criteria of the expanded pro-
gram participants. Also, expectations about the future of buyout programs were
probably different at the time of the expanded program simply because the pilot pro-
gram existed. This may have altered vessel owners’ decisions in ways not accounted
for in the models.
The availability of sufficient funds to conduct both a pilot and a full-scale
buyout may be unlikely to recur for other proposed buyouts. This may leave design
and implementation of a survey as the most likely vehicle for forecasting buyout
participation and costs. While our analysis of the expanded New England buyout
may have benefitted from the preferences revealed through the pilot program, a sur-
vey approach would offer a broader opportunity to gain deeper insights into the mo-
tivations for wanting to participate in a buyout and the factors which determine the
reservation price for fishing vessels in overcapitalized fisheries. In either case (a
survey or a pilot), the general decision modeling approach used for the New En-
gland case study would be appropriate.
To improve the ability to forecast behavior in future buyout programs, buyout
administrators should consider collecting additional information from the buyout ap-
plicant or through a survey of potential program participants. Such information
would certainly have improved our understanding of why some individuals chose to
participate, while others did not. Information about the vessel owner’s financial situ-
ation or indebtedness would have been particularly helpful since the buyout was
implemented as part of an overall financial assistance program. In addition to finan-
cial information data should be collected on owner’s demographic characteristics;
owner’s fishing experience, participation in other fisheries, and alternative occupa-
tional opportunities.
Table 5
Comparison of Predicted to Actual Vessels Removed in the Expanded Program
Forecasted Actual
Removals Removals
Number of removed vessels 51 68
Average bid $443,830 $331,600
Average ratio of groundfish revenue to total revenue 0.95 0.89
Average annual total revenue $464,017 $344,500
Average annual groundfish revenue $423,879 $326,900
Average annual allocated days-at-sea 116 112
Average vessel age 21 19
Average horse power 580 519
Average vessel length (feet) 75 66
Average gross tons 129 102
Average ton days 15,389 12,288
Total ton days (millions) 0.78 0.84Kitts, Thunberg, and Robertson 232
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